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The Quality of Government Expert Survey (QoG Expert Survey) is a research project aimed 
at documenting the organizational design of public bureaucracies and bureaucratic behavior in 
countries around the world. This report documents the design and implementation of the third 
wave of the QoG Expert Survey, and initial analysis of the new data. The QoG Expert Survey 
2020 produced ten country-level indicators, pertaining to bureaucratic structure (meritocratic re- 
cruitment, security of tenure, closedness) and bureaucratic behavior (political interference into 
day-to-day bureaucratic decision-making and impartiality). The data is based on the assessments 
of more than 550 experts, carefully selected for their contextual subject-matter knowledge. The 
experts took part in the research pro bono. The main innovation of the third wave is the use of 
anchoring vignettes and Item-Response Theory (IRT)-based aggregation techniques to produce 
point estimates that account and adjust for systematic differences in expert subjective assess- 
ments and variation in expert reliability. The resulting indicators are internally coherent and also 
correlate well with other well-established measures for the same concepts. The strength of the 
association between the data from 2020 and the two previous waves of the survey suggests that 
the data is likely to measure the same underling phenomena, while offering enough variability 






The Quality of Government (QoG) Expert Survey 2020 is the third iteration of a well-established 
research project by the Quality of Government Institute at the University of Gothenburg. The project 
is motivated by the lack of observational data pertaining to bureaucratic organization and practices 
(Dahlström et al., 2015). The aim of the survey is to empirically capture the organizational design of 
public bureaucracies and bureaucratic behavior in countries around the world. 
Conceptually, the project is underpinned by two theoretical frameworks. The first — the Weberian 
bureaucracy framework — associates a set of organizational features of public bureaucracies with 
developmental outcomes (Weber, 1978). Although Max Weber laid out a theory of developmental 
bureaucracy more than 100 years ago, empirical research testing the effects of Weberianism only 
began in the 1990s with a pioneering work by Peter Evans and James Rauch (Evans & Rauch, 1999; 
Rauch & Evans, 2000). In their seminal effort, Evans and Rauch mapped the bureaucratic structures 
in 35 less developed countries with regard to several prominent features of Weberian bureaucracy: 
meritocratic recruitment, career security, promotion and remuneration. Meritocratic recruitment, ca- 
reer security and openness/closedness became the features from Weber’s original characterization of 
developmental bureaucracy that have attracted the most attention of scholars of comparative bureau- 
cracy (Boräng et al., 2018; Charron et al., 2017; Cingolani et al., 2015; Cornell et al., 2020; Dahlström 
et al., 2012; Krause et al., 2006; Lapuente & Nistotskaya, 2009; Lapuente & Suzuki, 2020; Lewis, 
2007; Miller & Whitford, 2016; Nistotskaya & Cingolani, 2016; Oliveros & Schuster, 2018; Rauch, 
1995; Suzuki & Hur, 2020; Ting et al., 2013). 
The second theoretical framework — quality of government as impartiality — argues that impartiality 
in the exercise of public authority is the key behavioral attribute of public bureaucracy that leads to 
socially valued outcomes (Rothstein & Teorell, 2008). Empirical studies showed that impartiality of 
government, measured through expert assessments or citizen perceptions, is associated with increased 
entrepreneurship rates (Nistotskaya et al., 2015), aggregate economic growth (Ahlerup et al., 2016), 
innovation (Suzuki & Demircioglu, 2019), lower electorate support for populist parties (Agerberg, 




The project began in 2008 with the first wave of the QoG Expert Survey (Dahlström et al., 2010), and 
the second survey was carried out in 2014 (Dahlström et al., 2015). In each of these waves more than 
1,000 public administration scholars world-wide offered their judgements on such issues as the extent 
of meritocratic recruitment, career stability, internal promotion, impartiality, openness/closedness, 
women in public administration and many more.  The QoG Expert Survey 2015 (Dahlström et al., 
2015) produced 59 country-level indicators for 159 countries and became an established source of 
data in empirical research on institutional quality. 
Expert data, however, is a subject of critique for probable measurement error due to differences in a) 
how experts build their opinions and how they translate them into the ordinal scales (response options) 
imposed by researchers (the so-called problem of differential item functioning) and b) variation in 
expert reliability (Marquardt & Pemstein, 2018; Marquardt et al., 2019) that may produce biased 
results in statistical analyses (Lindstadt et al., 2020; Marquardt, 2020). In the third wave of the survey 
we address and adjust for these issues by applying anchoring vignettes and computational techniques 
based on Item-Response Theory (IRT). 
This report proceeds as follows: in section 2 we discuss the operationalization of the main concepts; 
in section 3 we present the survey instrument; section 4 describes the process of fielding the survey 
online; in section 5 we briefly describe the corps of experts and discusses whether their individual 
characteristics impact their assessments; section 6 describes the methodology behind our country- 
level point estimates; section 7 presents our data — ten country-level indicators; section 8 tests the 
content, convergence and construct validity of the indicators; section 10 compares data from 2020 
with that of 2015; section 11 summarizes the main takeaways. 
 
 
2 Concepts and their operationalization 
 
We operationalize the concept of Weberian bureaucracy through meritocratic recruitment (and its op- 
posite — patronage), security of tenure and closedness. Meritocratic recruitment is an organizational 
feature, where individual merits — such as education, knowledge, skills and job-related experience 




cated upon the political and/or personal connections of the applicant is opposite to merit, as embodied 
in such empirical phenomena as nepotism, different forms of cronyism,1 and partisanship. Security 
of tenure refers to the organizational practice in which no arbitrary dismissals take place, and legal 
provisions specifying the circumstances and reasons for dismissal from office are observed in real- 
ity.  Following the QoG Expert Survey tradition (Dahlström et al., 2010), we call this vector of the 
structural characteristics of public bureaucracies Professionalism. 
In line with the literature that argues that Closedness is another dimension of bureaucratic organiza- 
tions (Lœgreid & Wise, 2007; Silberman, 1993) that is distinctive from Professionalism (Dahlström et 
al., 2010, 2012), we operationalize closed public bureaucracies as organizations in which 
 
• new employees are normally hired to the lowest-level positions and vacant positions at a rela- 
tively high level of responsibility (mid-career) are opened only to the current employees of the 
organization; 
• hiring to bureaucratic agencies involves formal civil service examination (in contrast to the 
hiring process in the private sector, involving a resume check and interview, but not an exam); 
• human resource management is regulated by a set of laws and regulations applicable only to 
the public sector (including government), which is different from the country’s labor code. 
 
We expect the individual characteristics of each of the dimensions to be highly correlated: merit and 
tenure is expected to be positively correlated, and patronage is expected to be negatively correlated 
with both merit and tenure. Similarly, all three properties of the closedness dimension are expected 
to be positively correlated. However, Professionalism and Closedness do not need to go hand in hand 
in the sense that a less politicized bureaucracy should not also be a more “closed” one. We, therefore, 
expect the Professionalism and Closedness indices to be uncorrelated. 
With regard to bureaucratic behavior, we focus on impartiality and operationalize it in line with the 
definition by Rothstein & Teorell (2008). They define impartiality as follows: “when deciding upon a 
case, a public official should not take into consideration anything about the applicant’s circumstances, 




which is not stipulated in policy or law beforehand” (Rothstein & Teorell, 2008, p. 170). Following a 
large political economy literature (Lewis, 2007; Miller, 2000; Miller & Whitford, 2016; Nistot- skaya 
& Cingolani, 2016), we consider day-to-day interference by individual political figures into 
bureaucratic decision-making the largest threat to bureaucratic impartiality. We expect our measures 
of Impartiality and Politicization to be strongly negatively correlated. 
To capture the above postulated properties of bureaucratic structure and bureaucratic behavior, we 





The questionnaire consists of three parts. Part one has eight questions, pertaining to the bureaucratic 
structure and bureaucratic behavior in the central government of the country of their selection.3 Six of 
eight questions pertain to organizational design and two to behavioral attributes. All eight questions, 
including preambles and response options can be found in Appendix A. 
Part two of the questionnaire contains anchoring vignettes — short hypothetical scenarios that ex- 
perts assess, thereby providing information that allows researchers to “anchor” differing expert as- 
sessments to a more consistent scale. The QoG Expert Survey’s vignettes describe hypothetical 
situations regarding the recruitment to public bureaucracy, career stability, interference of politicians 
into day-to-day bureaucratic decision-making and the extent to which bureaucrats follow the letter of 
the law when dealing with individual cases. There are no vignettes pertaining to the concept of 
openness/closedness. 
The vignettes were designed using best practice, and we benefited from advice and discussions with 
colleagues with expertise on the matter at the Department of Political Science, University of Gothen- 
burg, and worldwide. The vignettes mention neither specific country, nor time period, and require 
2Since the main innovation of this survey is the use of anchoring vignettes, and given that experts take part in the 
survey pro bono and their time is a precious commodity, we had to limit the number of vignettes presented to experts. 
We, therefore, selected key properties that have generated the most scholarly interest. 
3We focus on the central government (not on the country’s public bureaucracy more generally as it was in the previous 
rounds) in order to achieve a higher precision of expert assessments. We found a strong association between indicators 
from all three waves of the survey (see Section 10 for more detail), suggesting that experts treat the central government’s 




no specific knowledge to assess the case. Experts were informed that the vignettes were designed to 
help the researchers to create better country-level measures, and not as a check on their expertise. Ap- 
pendix A provides three vignettes on Patronage by way of example. The description of all vignettes 
is available upon request. Section 6 discusses in more detail the use of information from anchoring 
vignettes for estimating latent values. 
Part three of the questionnaire contains questions regarding the personal characteristics of the experts, 
including their highest level of education, work place, working experience, self-assessment of their 
subject-matter knowledge, as well as age, gender, country of origin and country of current residence. 
All background questions are provided in Appendix A. 
 
 
4 Fielding the survey online 
 
The link to the pilot survey was distributed to 127 experts, randomly selected from the QoG’s pool 
of experts, in September 2019, and by the end of October 2019 twenty-three experts had filled in the 
pilot questionnaire. In the pilot version all questions were vignetted, with four vignettes per 
Professionalism and Impartiality question, each targeting a relative distance between two specific 
response categories on the 5-point response scale. For the Closedness questions, one vignette per 
question was designed. 
Nineteen responses containing answers to all the vignettes were subjected to the vignette diagnostics 
as per King & Wand (2007), using the software package “Anchors” in R (Wand et al., 2011). By 
analyzing whether and to what extent the respondents violated the predefined order of vignettes (i.e. 
by ranking a high-intensity vignette lower than a low-intensity vignette), we were able to assess the 
success of the vignettes. Our analysis of the pilot vignettes suggested that some vignettes exhibited 
substantial ordering inconsistency across experts, and therefore were not an effective tool in providing 
information about expert thresholds.4 
Based on this analysis, together with the respondents’ feedback that the survey was particularly time- 
 
4This situation is not uncommon. For example, the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project replaces about 20 percent 




consuming, the vignettes were edited, re-written or dropped altogether. Specifically, the vignettes for 
the binary questions about closedness were dropped, and for the remaining questions three vignettes 
per question were retained. This reduction was not merely an issue of dropping the fourth vignette; 
instead, the vignettes were edited or rewritten so as to more coherently reflect low-intensity, mid- 
intensity and high-intensity scenarios corresponding to the particular question item. This effectively 
reduced the total number of vignette questions from 24 to 15. 
In order to increase our country coverage and make better estimates for each country, we conducted a 
new expert recruitment campaign. First, we published a call for experts on the Quality of Government 
Institute’s website and its social media accounts. Second, for several countries particularly low on 
the number of experts, we reached out to those country experts who had already answered the survey 
with a request to recommend experts. Third, we continued to identify country experts by scanning 
relevant academic journals and the websites of targeted universities and NGOs. With these efforts, we 
were able to make a significant contribution to the expert pool and, ultimately, the overall response 
rate of the final survey. 
The main survey was fielded between December 2019 and June 2020. In December 2019 the survey 
link was sent to more than 6,000 experts from the QoG Institute’s pool of experts, of whom 996 
individuals responded to at least the first part of the questionnaire, and 822 individuals completed the 
first and second (vignettes) parts of the survey. 
Respondents could select the language of the questionnaire. The overwhelming majority of them (86 
percent) selected the questionnaire in English, followed by the Spanish, Russian and French language 
questionnaires (7, 4 and 3 percent respectively). 
Section 5 below discusses in more detail the individual characteristics of the experts that took part in 






The Quality of Government Institute at the Department of Political Science at the University of 
Gothenburg (Sweden) maintains a pool of country experts on bureaucratic structures and bureau- 
cratic behavior in countries around the world. The pool was first assembled in 2008 and has been 
periodically updated by adding newly identified individuals. We identify experts among scholars from 
those with a record of peer-reviewed publication on public bureaucracy matters; professionals from 
donor organizations (such as USAID or SIDA, the U.S. and Swedish government agencies for de- 
velopment cooperation) or international organizations (such as the World Bank, IMF, Inter-American 
Development Bank) working on administrative reforms, international and national non-governmental 
organizations; and government officials with proven knowledge on their country’s bureaucratic struc- 
ture and behavior. 
The number of experts varies from question to question: from 1 to 42 respondents. Table B.1 of the 
Appendix reports countries with less than three experts per country, and Table B.2 reports countries 
with more than three experts per country. Given the natural process of attrition,5 not all QoG experts 
provided the vignette responses. Nonetheless, 822 respondents provided responses to both part one 
of the survey and all the vignettes. Thus, the response rate for the vignette part is 83 percent, which 
is on a par with the return in projects employing paid coders, such as V-Dem (Pemstein et al., 2018, 
p.9). 
Below we provide some descriptive statistics regarding these 822 experts. The overwhelming major- 
ity of these respondents (79 percent) provided assessments for the country in which they live, while 
only 27 experts filled in the survey for more than one country. 
Gender: 72 percent of these experts are male and 27 percent are female, with the rest selecting either 
“Other” or “Prefer not to say” options (N=816). 
Age: the largest share of respondents (40 percent) are aged 36-50, followed by a group aged 51-65 
(37 percent). Experts older than 65 years make up 17 percent of all respondents. The age group 25-35 





constitutes 6 percent of all experts who completed the survey. There is only one expert younger than 
25 years (N=815). 
Education: the overwhelming majority (81 percent) of experts reported having a PhD degree, fol- 
lowed by an MA-level degree (17 percent) and the remaining 2 percent reported a BA-level degree 
(N=816). 
Employment: nearly three quarters of all experts (71 percent) work at a public or private university. 
Experts employed in the third sector make up 9 percent of the sample and another 3 percent work  in 
the private sector. Those working in the public sector constitute 6 percent, including 4 percent of 
those who work in the central government. Finally, 11 percent of the experts chose “Other” as their 
current employer (N=813). 
Experience: the majority of the experts (38.5 percent) have worked in their current employment for 
more than 16 years. Those who have worked between 2 and 10 years make up 37 percent of all 
respondents. 17.5 percent have worked between 11 and 16 years, and 7 percent have worked less 
than 2 years (N=813). 
Self-evaluation of contextual knowledge: almost 70 percent of the experts evaluated their knowledge 
of bureaucratic structures and bureaucratic behavior in the central government of their chosen country 
as 6 or 7 on a 7-point scale. Another 20 percent self-assessed their knowledge as 5 (N=813). 
 
 
5.1 Individual-level determinants of expert assessments 
 
Before proceeding with the aggregation of expert assessments, we ran a series of regression analy- 
ses between individual expert assessments and their background characteristics. Previous research 
has suggested that an expert’s background can influence their perception of latent traits of complex 
empirical phenomena (for a review see, Marquardt (2020)). This literature points to gender, age, 
education, employment, and self-assessment of the knowledge of the case as factors that may affect 
assessments in a systematic way. 




in part one of the questionnaire, i.e. their assessments of bureaucratic structure and bureaucratic 
behavior.6 After the exclusion of missing values and “Don’t know” answers from the outcomes 
variables, the number of observations is 780. The explanatory variables are six variables capturing 
expert background:  gender, age, education, workplace, work experience (years), self-assessment  of 
subject-matter knowledge. We dichotomize the workplace variable: 1 = experts with university 
education, 0 = else. 
Table C.1 of the Appendix reports OLS regressions estimates. Overall, we find little evidence of a 
consistent substantial relationship between expert characteristics and their assessments. The most 
consistent relationship is between university employment and assessments: the coefficient for this 
dummy variable enters statistically significant in six out of eight assessments. In all regressions this 
coefficient is negatively signed: on average university staff tend to evaluate bureaucratic structure as 
less Weberian and bureaucratic behavior as less impartial. The university employment variable also 
has the largest magnitude of all: up to a third of one step of the assessment scale. We replicated this 
analysis, controlling for country fixed effects (Table C.2 of the Appendix) to find the results to be 
substantively the same. Furthermore, we replicated the above analysis using the sample of experts 
coming from countries for which at least three experts answered part one of the questionnaire (N of 
experts = 568, N of countries = 101), to find the results to be substantively the same as those reported 
in Table C.2.7 In sum, expert characteristics do not seem to affect assessments in a systematic way. 
 
 
6 Computing country-level estimates for latent variables 
 
Impartiality, meritocratic recruitment, closedness are, as are many other concepts in political sci- 
ence, complex concepts, for which there is no clear way to quantify objectively. Researchers and 
practitioners alike use expert assessments to measure concepts that are difficult to measure directly.8 
The QoG Expert Survey asks experts to quantify the extent to which a given case “embodies” such 
 
6This includes the experts who did not answer the vignette part of the questionnaire. 
7The results of this analysis are not reported in this document, but are available upon request. 
8For example, in addition to multiple research projects that use experts to capture complex concepts, the International 
Country Risk Guide by the commercial PRC Group has provided the “Quality of Bureaucracy” indicator for 140 countries 




concepts as impartiality by selecting an answer on an ordinal scale (from low to high). The root 
problem with expert assessments of complex concepts is that experts are likely to recall different 
empirical manifestations of a phenomenon. For example, for meritocratic recruitment, one expert 
may think of the frequency of job advertisements in the media, while another may think of whether 
such job advertisements describe the educational requirements for candidates in sufficient detail; yet, 
the third may focus only on whether the selection procedure involves formal examination or not. In 
other words, different expert are likely to recall different empirical manifestations of a complex phe- 
nomenon when making their assessment of a case. Furthermore, when building their assessment on 
several pieces of relevant information, experts are likely to give some information more weight than 
others. Finally, experts need to place their assessments on ordinal scales (answer options) developed 
by researchers. The difference between answer options (thresholds) — such as, “Only a few of the 
appointments are based on merit” and “Almost no appointments are based on merit” — is open to 
interpretation. Experts are very likely to understand these differences idiosyncratically and apply 
these thresholds differently: being more or less strict. These problems, known as differential item 
functioning (DIF), are a major threat to the validity of expert data. DIF can be found both between 
experts within the same country (Marquardt et al., 2019) and across countries (Bakker et al., 2020), 
and could be the result of both the observable (e.g. working experience, place of employment) and 
unobservable individual differences between experts. 
In order to account and adjust for DIF, we apply — following the literature (Bakker et al., 2020; King 
& Wand, 2007; Marquardt & Pemstein, 2018) — anchoring vignettes, which allow us to “anchor” 
expert individual interpretations of the Likert scales (answer options) to a consistent scale. Anchoring 
vignettes are short descriptions of imaginary scenarios that are designed in such a way as to gather 
information about the expert’s parameters for thresholds and then to estimate these threshold param- 
eters. We then incorporate these estimates into computations of the country-level indicators for our 
main concepts of interests: meritocracy, security of tenure and impartiality. To compute our country- 
level estimates we used information from experts who answered all three vignettes per question (with 
at most one ordering violation, including ties) and at a minimum three experts per country.9 
9This inclusion decision yielded the following number of responses per question: proff1(Patronage) = 553, 




Our computation approach follows the two Item-Response Theory (IRT) models of DIF by Marquardt 
& Pemstein (2018). While the ibeta model is built on “expert-specific intercepts, holding ordinal 
threshold constant across experts, the beta model is built on “expert-specific ordinal thresholds for 
mapping between latent and question scales” (Marquardt & Pemstein, 2018, p.432). In other words, 
the first model assumes that experts systematically over- or underestimate latent values. For example, 
there is no broad agreement between experts that bureaucracy in this country is largely filled through 
political/personal connections. On the other hand, the second model assumes that experts largely 
agree that bureaucracy in this country is based on political/personal connections, but disagree on the 
extent to which this is the case. The second model is “more general, since intercept DIF is a specific 
form of threshold-specific DIF. However, this more general parameterization demands much of the 
available data...” (Marquardt & Pemstein, 2018, p.432). Marquardt & Pemstein (2018) showed that 
the chosen IRT models perform better than other IRT models that do not account for DIF and variation 
in expert reliability, as well as non-IRT models such as Bayesian Aldrich-McKelvey (BAM) scaling 
Aldrich & McKelvey (1977). 
We computed the estimates using STAN programming language in R interface (Stan, 2020). For each 
variable, we ran the code four chains for 20,000 iterations with 5,000 warm-ups and a thinning 
interval of 20. 
 
 
7 Country-level estimates 
 
We calculated both the beta and ibeta country-level point estimates of the latent concepts of interest 
and quantified uncertainty around these point estimates for at least 83 (Political Interference variable) 
and at most 90 (Patronage variable) countries. The estimates are available for almost all European 
countries, as well as the USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. But the coverage in Africa, Asia 
and Latin America is less full. Table D.1 of the Appendix reports the number of countries in each of 
the major geographic regions for which estimates are available. Figure D.1 of the Appendix presents 
spatial distribution of Merit and Impartiality across the globe. 




generalizability of the beta model (Marquardt & Pemstein, 2018), we provide a set of beta country- 
level point estimates and measures of uncertainty. All estimates were recorded in such a way that 
higher values of Merit, Tenure and Impartiality stand for more meritocratic and impartial bureaucracy, 
and higher values of Patronage and Political Interference stand for more patrimonial and less impartial 
bureaucracy. Figures D.2, D.3, D.4, D.5, and D.6 in the Appendix report country-level point estimates 
with the associated credible intervals for all five latent concepts of interest. 
In addition, Table F.4 in the Appendix reports country-level indicators for all ten variables produced 
by the QoG Expert Survey 2020, including the estimates for five latent variables, simple averages for 
three variables of the Closedness dimension of bureaucratic structure and two indices (Professional- 





We demonstrate the validity of our measures by following the framework developed by Adcock & 
Collier (2001). We show: a) content validity by demonstrating that our measures of bureaucratic 
structure align with our two-dimensional conceptualization of welfare-enhancing public bureaucracy 
and the indicators for bureaucratic behavior align well with the concept of impartial bureaucracy; 
b) convergence validity by showing that they have the theoretically expected relationships with in- 
dicators that measure similar concepts and c) construct validity by showing that the measures of 




8.1 Content validity 
 
As discussed above, we expect individual measures of Professionalism, Closedness and Impartiality 
to be associated to a high degree. Specifically, Merit is expected to be positively associated with 
Tenure, and negatively associated with Patronage. Relatedly, Patronage and Tenure are expected to 




each other, but to be uncorrelated, or at best weakly correlated, with the measures of Professionalism. 
Finally, two measures of bureaucratic behavior (Political interference and Impartiality) are expected 
to be negatively correlated with each other. 
Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between different attributes of the Professionalism dimension of 
bureaucratic structures (with the grey lines depicting the averages). As can be seen, Merit is strongly 
negatively associated with Patronage (r = -.88***), and strongly positively with Tenure (r = .73***). 
Patronage and Tenure are also strongly negatively related (r = -.72***). 
Figure 1: Association between Merit, Tenure and Patronage 
 
Note: Left panel: scores for Merit (X axis) and Patronage (Y axis), r = -.88***, N = 82. Right panel: scores 
for Merit (X axis) and Tenure (Y axis), r = .73***, N = 82. 
 
The variables pertaining to the Closedness dimension are only weakly correlated with each other,10but 
they still load on one dimension in principal component analysis, allowing us to create a new variable 
— Closedness Index. 
 
As argued above, we expect Professionalism and Closedness to be orthogonal structural dimensions. 
Figure 2 illustrates the relationships between Merit, Tenure and Closedness Index, supporting this 
expectation. As can be observed, countries with high values on Merit exhibit varying levels of closed- 
ness. For example, New Zealand and Switzerland have meritocratic open bureaucracies, while Japan 
and South Korea have meritocratic closed bureaucracies (Figure 2, left panel). At the same time, 
countries with low values on Merit can have both open (Zambia) and closed (Lebanon or Vietnam) 
bureaucracies. A similar pattern is observed with regard to Tenure protection (Figure 2, right panel). 
10The strongest relation is between Examination and Special Laws (r = .29**), followed by between Entry at the 




Figure E.1 of the Appendix depicts association between Merit and each of the indicators of Closed- 
ness. 
Figure 2: Association between Merit, Tenure and Closedness Index 
 
Note: Left panel: scores for Closedness Index (X axis) and Merit (Y axis), r = -.17, N = 85. Right panel: scores 
for Closedness Index (X axis) and Tenure (Y axis), r = .09. N = 90. 
 
Furthermore, Figure 3 depicts the association between the Professionalism and Closedness indices.11 
The overall pattern is of a non-linear relationship between Professionalism and Closedness: highly 
professional bureaucracies can be both open and closed organizations. 




Note: Scores for Closedness Index (X axis) and Professionalism Index (Y axis). r = -.08. N = 80 
 
Finally, we expect the two measures of bureaucratic behavior to be strongly negatively associated 
11Professionalism Index is constructed with the help of Principal Component Analysis. Merit, Patronage and Tenure 




with each other. Indeed, as Figure 4 suggests, in countries where political interference into the day- 
to-day bureaucratic decision-making is high, impartiality is low (e.g. Venezuela, Uzbekistan, or Iraq), 
and vice-versa: where political interference is low, impartiality is high (e.g. New Zealand, Sweden or 
Germany). 




Note: Scores for Impartiality (X axis) and Political Interference (Y axis). r = -.82***, N = 77. 
 
Overall, the presented indicators tend to be associated with each other in the direction dictated by their 
conceptualizations. The measures of Professionalism exhibit very high cohesion, while indicators on 
Closedness are only weakly related to each other, suggesting avenues for future research, first  of all, 
in terms of improved conceptualization. Individual measures of Closedness still load on a single 
factor in the PCA analysis, as do measures of Professionalism, enabling associational analysis 
between them. The analysis provided support for the expectation that these two structural dimensions 
of bureaucracies are orthogonal. The indicators of bureaucratic behavior are internally cohesive as 
per the concept of impartial bureaucracy. 
 
 
8.2 Convergence validity 
 
To assess the convergence validity of our measures we analyze the association between our indicators 
and 1) V-Dem indicators of meritocratic recruitment and bureaucratic impartiality;12  and 2) ICRG’s 
12The V-Dem meritocracy question (textit v2stcritrecadm is as follows:  “To what extent are appointment decisions in 




measure of bureaucratic quality. We expect to observe strong correlations between our indicators and 
existing measures of meritocratic bureaucracy and impartiality, and indeed our estimates are strongly 
correlated with the V-Dem and ICRG measures. Specifically, the measures of the concept of 
meritocratic recruitment, produced by QoG and V-Dem, are strongly positively correlated (r = 
.80***). Similarly, the QoG and V-Dem measures of impartial bureaucracy are positively associated 
at an even higher level (r =.82***). Figure 5 provides a visual representation of these relationships. 
Figure 5: Association between measures of Merit and Impartiality by QoG and V-Dem 
 
Note: Left Panel: scores for Merit QoG (X axis) and Merit V-Dem (Y axis). r = -.80***, N = 85. Right panel: 
score for Impartiality QoG (X axis) and Impartiality V-Dem (Y axis), r = .83***, N = 83. 
 
Merit (QoG) is also positively associated with the ICRG’s indicator “Bureaucratic Quality” (r =.74***), 
while Patronage is associated with the same indicator negatively (r = -.68***). Similarly, the ICRG 
measure is strongly positively associated with our indicators of Impartiality (r = .81***). Although, 
the precise meaning of the ICRG’s concept of bureaucratic quality has not been disclosed by its 
commercial owners,  the overall institutional qualities valued by entrepreneurs and investors,  such  
as stability, predictability and the absence of threat of expropriation (Henisz, 2000; Jensen, 2008; 
Knott & Miller, 2006; North & Weingast, 1989), are also those that are associated with meritocratic 
impartial bureaucracy (Miller, 2000; Nistotskaya & Cingolani, 2016). Therefore, we interpret these 
strong correlations as supporting convergence validity of our measures. Figure E.2 in the Appendix 
specification clarifies: “Appointment decisions include hiring, firing and promotion in the state administration. Note that 
the question refers to the typical de facto (rather than de jure) situation obtaining in the state administration, excluding 
the armed forces. If there are large differences between different branches of the state administration or between top  and 
lower level state administrators please try to consider the average when answering the question. The Impartiality question 
(2clrspct) is “Are public officials rigorous and impartial in the performance of their duties?”. The specification is: “This 
question focuses on the extent to which public officials generally abide by the law and treat like cases alike, or conversely, 
the extent to which public administration is characterized by arbitrariness and biases (i.e., nepotism, cronyism, or 
discrimination). The question covers the public officials that handle the cases of ordinary people. If no functioning public 




illustrates the relationship between Merit, Impartiality and ICRG Bureaucratic Quality. 
 
In sum, our indicators and the measures originated within both the research and practitioners’ worlds, 
show a high degree of convergence. 
 
 
8.3 Construct validity 
 
Construct validation strategies involve demonstrating that the measure in question yields theoreti- 
cally expected results. Following two influential studies about the link between merit-based public 
bureaucracy and corruption (Dahlström et al., 2012; Evans & Rauch, 1999), we leverage our measure 
of meritocratic bureaucracy (Merit) against the World Bank’s Control of corruption, controlling for 
levels of economic development (logGDPpc) and democracy (V-Dem’s polyarchy). Figure 6 shows 
a scatterplot between Merit and Control of Corruption after netting out the influence of the control 
variables. 
The coefficient for Merit is statistically significant and is signed as expected, suggesting that higher 
Merit is associated with lower corruption (higher Control of corruption). The size of Merit’s coef- 
ficient is non-trivial: one unit increase in Merit corresponds to almost .7 unit increase in Control of 
corruption.13 We replicate the analysis, using V-Dem’s measure of corruption (Political Corruption 
Index) and Freedom House’s measure of democracy to find the results to be substantially the same 
(not reported). 
In another analysis, following Nistotskaya & Cingolani (2016), we leverage Merit against the World 
Bank’s measures of Regulatory Quality and Ease of Doing Business, controlling for the levels of 
economic development and democracy. Figure 7 shows a scatter plot between Merit and Regulatory 
quality after netting out the influence of the controls. 
The coefficient for Merit is statistically significant and is signed as expected, suggesting that higher 
Merit is associated with better regulatory quality. We re-run the analysis, using the World Bank’s 
Ease of Doing Business, to find Merit to be strongly associated with better government regulation 
regarding entrepreneurship (see Figure E.3 in the Appendix). 








Note: Data for Control of corruption and Merit are for the year 2019; democracy and logGDPpc are for the 
year 2018, N = 82. 




Note: Data for Regulatory Quality and Merit are for the year 2019; democracy and logGDPpc are for the year 
2018, N = 83. 
 
Finally, following the influential publication by Rauch & Evans (2000) and its more recent edition by 




and the level of economic development (measured through logGDPpc) on the other. Figure 8 shows 
scatterplots between Merit and GDPpc (Left panel) and Impartiality and GDPpc (right panel) after 
netting out the impact of the level of democracy in 2018. The coefficients for Merit and Impartiality 
are statistically significant and are signed as expected. 
Figure 8: Partial Regression Plot: Merit, Impartiality and GDPpc 
 
 
Note: Left Panel: Merit and (log) GDPpc (year = 2019), Right Panel: Impartiality and (log) GDPpc (year = 
2019), control variable is Democracy (year = 2018). 
 
Overall, our construct validity analyses suggest that the examined measures yield theoretically ex- 
pected results.14 Across all types of validation exercises — content, convergence and construct — the 
QoG Expert Survey data performs consistently, thereby lending confidence to users in the validity of 
the QoG Expert Survey data. 
 
 
9 Point estimates vs simple averages 
 
Are there any meaningful differences between the produced IRT estimated and simple averages? The 
correlations between the two are very high (Pearson’s r is at least 0.96***), but we explore this further 
by creating two rank ordered variables, based on the values in the raw data and IRT estimates. For 
example, for Merit we created two new variables, running from 1 to 86, where 1 stands for the highest 
and 86 for the lowest values on simple averages and IRT estimates. We, then, plot these new variables 
14Given that at the moment of this report’s preparation the data for many dependent variables was available only for 
the year 2019, our construct validation exercise is somewhat limited and further analysis should be carried out at a later 




against each other. 
 
Figure 9 displays these comparisons for Merit and Impartiality, depicting in red countries that differ in 
rank ordering between the two measures by at least two standard deviations. As can be observed, for 
the overwhelming majority of the countries rank ordering does not exceed two standard deviations. 
The divergence from the “perfect” fit occurs in the region with the observation scoring lower on merit 
and impartiality (lower ranking countries). 
Figure 9: Simple Averages and IRT Estimates for Merit and Impartiality: Comparison of Rank Orders 
 
Note: Values on the X axis are rank orders based on IRT estimates. Values on the Y axis are rank orders based 
on simple averages. Left panel: rank order for Merit (lower value - higher rank). Right panel: rank order for 
Impartiality (lower value - higher rank. 
 
Our analysis suggests that although there are some differences in the rank ordering of the countries 
across the two scales, for the overwhelming majority of the observations, these differences are not 
large. This is in line with previous research that points out that well-run research projects generate 
robust raw expert-coded data (Bakker et al., 2020; Marquardt, 2020). 
 
 
10 QoG Expert Surveys 2011, 2015 and 2020:  Comparison 
 
In this section we briefly consider data from the three waves of the QoG Expert Survey: 2011,15 2015 
and 2020. Table F.1 in the Appendix reports the questions from the QoG Expert Surveys 2011, 2015 
and 2020, representing the concepts of interest.  The wording of the questions is either identical (for 




example, for the concepts of merit or impartiality) or substantively similar. The only exception is the 
question for Tenure, with the question from 2011 and 2015 only indirectly tapping into the concept 
of security of tenure as freedom from arbitrary dismissal. 
Table F.2 reports Pearson’s correlation coefficients for the Professionalism and Impartiality traits, 
measured as simple averages in 2011, 2015 and as IRT-based estimates in 2020. As one can see, the 
strength of the correlation is high for all pairs of indicators (r = [.69; .81] at the 99 percent level), 
except for Tenure, for which Pearson’s r ranges between .3*** and .7***. 
Table F.3 reports Pearson’s correlation coefficients for the Closedness traits, measured as simple av- 
erages in all three waves. While the strength of the association over time for the Examination variable 
is high (r = [.66; .72] at the 99 percent level), the Special laws variable is moderately associated over 
time (r = [.46; .60] at the 99 percent level). The data for the Entry level variable is only availabe for 
the second and third waves, and the association over time is moderate (r = .49***). 
We further explore the alignment of the 2015 and 2020 data by creating a set of rank ordered variables, 
based on the values of the same variables from 2015 and 2020, and then plotting these new variables 
against each other. Figure 10 displays these comparisons for Merit and Impartiality, depicting (in red) 
countries that differ in rank ordering between the two measures by at least two standard deviations. 
As can be observed, for the overwhelming majority of the countries rank ordering does not exceed 
two standard deviations. However, Albania, Ecuador and Poland dropped in the ranking of Merit (left 
panel) by more than two standard deviations. When it comes to Impartiality (right panel), while four 
countries considerably (that is, by more than two standard deviations) slipped down in the ranking 
(China, Jordan, Malta and Turkey), two countries considerably improved their standing (Bosnia- 
Herzegovina and Estonia). Figure F.1 of the Appendix depicts the relationship between 2015 and 
2020 scores for Patronage. 
To gain greater confidence in the validity of the data, researchers may want to assess the alignment 
of these changes in the rankings with the true state of affairs through existing or original case studies. 
For example, there exists evidence of institutional de-meritocratization of the Polish bureaucracy after 
the 2015 presidential and parliamentary elections, when, by the end of 2015, many bureaucratic posts 








Note: Values on the X axis are from 2020. Values on the Y axis are from 2015. Left panel: rank order for 
Merit (lower value - higher rank). Right panel: rank order for Impartiality (lower value - higher rank). 
 
et al., 2017, p.96). 
 
In summation, the strength of the association between the indicators of Professionalism (except for 
Tenure) and Impartiality across the three waves suggests that the data is likely to measure the same 
underlying phenomena, yet offering enough variability over time to use these data in time-series 
analysis. The areas of low over-time correlation — among the measures of Closedness and Tenure 






This report documents the design and implementation of the third wave of the QoG Expert Survey, 
and initial analysis of the new data. The QoG Expert Survey is concerned with generating reputable 
data on bureaucratic structures and bureaucratic behavior in countries around the world. 
Beset with the critique that expert estimates may be systematically biased, we decided to employ a 
series of anchoring vignettes — a methodological device used to address the problem of differential 
item functioning that is at the heart of systematic differences in expert subjective assessments. While 
well-functioning anchoring vignettes is a key element of the success of this approach, it is impos- 




suggested that some vignettes in the main survey continued to exhibit ordering inconsistency across 
experts, which led to the exclusion of wrongly ranked vignettes from the calculation of the estimates. 
In the next iteration of the survey we will replace the under-performing vignettes with new ones. 
Using the information from the vignettes, we built country-level point estimates for five important 
concepts: Patronage, Merit, Tenure, Political Interference and Impartiality. The 2020 edition of the 
survey collected data on the closedness of public bureaucracies, generating three indicators capturing 
different aspects of the Closedness dimension of bureaucratic structure (but without vignettes). In 
addition to these, two indices — Professionalism and Closedness — were constructed, using Principal 
Component Analysis. 
We conducted several thorough exercises to assess the validity of our data. Content validation showed 
that the individual elements of the Professionalism dimension of bureaucratic structure is internally 
cohesive, but the Closedness dimension is less so, pointing to the need for a careful application of 
these data in empirical research. The two indicators of bureaucratic behavior (Political Interference 
and Impartiality) showed high internal cohesion. The convergence validity exercise demonstrated that 
our country-level estimates for Merit and Impartiality are highly correlated with similar measures 
generated by the academic and business communities. Finally, the construct validation analyses 
showed that the measures in question yield the theoretically expected results. 
We checked the correspondence between the simple averages and point estimates, which demon- 
strated that for the overwhelming majority of observations (countries), the data is more similar than 
different, lending confidence to users of the raw QoG Expert Survey data. 
We also assessed the correspondence between data from all three waves of the QoG Expert Sur- vey. 
The revealed strength of the association between the indicators of Professionalism (exclusive of 
Tenure) and Impartiality suggests that the data is likely to measure the same underling phenomena, 
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A.1 Part One 
 
Bureaucratic structure: Professionalism 
Patronage 
Preamble: We are interested in how individuals are appointed to bureaucratic positions in the central 
government in the country you have selected. Specifically, we are interested in whether or not the 
individual’s political and/or personal connections constitute the main grounds for the hiring. We are 
interested in how things work in reality (de facto), not how they look on paper (de jure). 
Q1: In your chosen country, to what extent are appointments to bureaucratic positions in the central 
government based on the political and/or personal connections of the applicant? 
Answer options: 
 
• Almost all appointments are based on political and/or personal connections. (5) 
• Most of the appointments are based on political and/or personal connections, and only a few of 
the positions are filled meritocratically. (4) 
• About half of the appointments are based on political and/or personal connections. (3) 
• Only a few of the appointments are based on political and/or personal connections, and most 
positions are filled meritocratically. (2) 
• Almost no appointments are based on political and/or personal connections. (1) 
• Don’t know. (99) 
 
Merit 
Preamble Still on the subject of appointments we are interested in whether or not the individuals’ 
merits – such as education, knowledge, skills and job-related experience – constitute the main grounds 
for the hiring to bureaucratic positions in the central government of the country you selected. 
Please note that for some bureaucratic positions, hiring based on political considerations is legally 
permissible. Such positions may include heads of departments within ministries and agencies or staff 
supporting the work of ministers (for example, advisers and aids). Please disregard such positions 
when considering your answer to this question. 
We are interested in how things work in reality (de facto), not how they look on paper (de jure). 
Q2: In your chosen country, to what extent are appointments to bureaucratic positions in the central 






• Almost all appointments are based on merit. (1) 
• Most of the appointments are based on merit.(2) 
• About half of the appointments are based on merit. (3) 
• Only a few of the appointments are based on merit. (4) 
• Almost no appointments are based on merit. (5) 
• Don’t know. (99) 
 
Tenure 
Preamble: We are interested in whether or not bureaucrats working in ministries and other bureau- 
cratic agencies of the central government of the country you have selected enjoy security of tenure. 
By security of tenure we mean legal guarantee that an office-holder cannot be fired from office ex- 
cept for actions clearly specified in the law, such as, for example, bribery or other misconduct. By 
enjoy security of tenure we mean that the legal provisions specifying circumstances and reasons for 
dismissal from office are observed in reality, and no arbitrary dismissals take place. 
Q3: In your chosen country, to what extent do bureaucrats working in ministries and other bureau- 
cratic agencies of the central government enjoy security of tenure? 
Answer options:17 
 
• Public officials enjoy very strong security of tenure and dismissals are hardly ever arbitrary. (1) 
• Public officials enjoy security of tenure and dismissals are occasionally arbitrary. (2) 
• Public officials enjoy some security of tenure and dismissals are arbitrary about half of the 
time. (3) 
• Public officials enjoy weak security of tenure and dismissals are often arbitrary. (4) 
• Public officials enjoy very weak security of tenure and dismissals are almost always arbitrary. 
(5) 
• Don’t know. (99) 
 
Bureaucratic structure: Closedness 
Entry level 
Preamble: We are interested in whether or not ministries and other bureaucratic agencies of the central 
government in the country you have selected are open or closed organizations. For the purpose of this 
survey, the notions of open organizations and closed organizations are defined as follows: 
16The values of the Q2 variable were recorded in such a way that higher values stand for more merit-based appoint- 
ments. 




Open organizations are those in which vacant positions of any level of hierarchy are open to both 
internal and external candidates, and employment opportunities at a relatively high level of responsi- 
bility (mid-career) are not uncommon. 
Closed organizations are those in which new employees are normally hired to the lowest-level posi- 
tions and vacant positions at a relatively high level of responsibility (mid-career) are opened only to 
the current employees of the organization. 
Q4: On average, do most ministries and other bureaucratic agencies of the central government in 
your chosen country resemble closed or open type of organizations? 
Answer options: 
 
• Open: entry to bureaucratic positions is open at any level of hierarchy. (0) 
• Closed: entry to bureaucratic positions is possible at the lowest level of hierarchy only, and 
positions at middle and higher levels of hierarchy are filled by individuals from within the 
bureaucracy. (1) 
• Don’t know. (99) 
 
Examination 
Preamble: We are interested to know whether or not hiring to ministries and other bureaucratic 
agencies of the central government of your chosen country involves formal civil service examination 
or if the hiring process is more like in the private sector, involving a resume check and interview, but 
not a sit-in exam. 
Q5: When a recruitment process to bureaucratic positions in the central government in your chosen 
country is held, does this process usually involve a formal examination? 
Answer options: 
 
• Yes, formal examination is usually part of the hiring process. (1) 
• No, formal examination is usually not part of the hiring process. (0) 
• Don’t know. (99) 
 
Special laws 
Preamble: Thinking about bureaucratic positions of the ministries and other bureaucratic agencies of 
the central government in your chosen country, is human resource management regulated by a set of 
laws and regulations applicable only to the public sector (including government), which is different 
from the country’s labor code? 
Q6: Thinking about bureaucratic positions of the ministries and other bureaucratic agencies of the 
central government in your chosen country, is human resource management regulated by a set of laws 
and regulations applicable only to the public sector (including government), which is different from 





• Yes, there are special human resource management laws/regulations applicable only to the 
public sector employees, including government. (1) 
• No, a general labor code that regulates human resource management in the private sector is 
applicable to public sector employees, including government. (0) 




Preamble: We are interested in how often individual politicians personally or through their staff (for 
example, aids and secretaries) interfere into day-to-day bureaucratic decision-making. 
The term politician refers to members of the national legislature and also to the members of executive 
(such as ministers and heads of agencies). By day-to-day bureaucratic decision-making we mean 
specific operational decisions stemming from existing laws and regulations. By interference we mean 
(unethical, unconstitutional or illegal) actions by individual politicians, who act personally or through 
their staff, to influence the content of a specific bureaucratic decision. 
Q7: In your chosen country, how often is day-to-day bureaucratic decision-making subject to inter- 
ference from individual politicians? 
Answer options: 
 
• Almost always. Day-to-day bureaucratic decision-making is almost always subject to political 
interference. (5) 
• Often. Day-to-day bureaucratic decision-making is often subject to political interference. (4) 
• About half of the time. Day-to-day bureaucratic decision-making is subject to political inter- 
ference approximately half of the time. (3) 
• Occasionally. Day-to-day bureaucratic decision-making is occasionally subject to political in- 
terference. (2) 
• Hardly ever. Day-to-day bureaucratic decision-making is hardly ever subject to political inter- 
ference. (1) 
• Don’t know. (99) 
 
Impartiality 
Preamble: We are interested in how often bureaucrats in your chosen country act impartially when 
implementing laws and regulations. Here, impartiality means that when implementing laws and 
regulations, bureaucrats do not take into consideration any information about the person(s) or case(s) 
that is not required by a law or regulation. Unlike the previous question about interference into day-
to-day bureaucratic decision-making by politicians, this question refers to situations in which 
bureaucrats are free from political influence and make decisions exclusively at their own discretion. 




Q8: In your chosen country, how often do bureaucrats of the central government act impartially when 
implementing laws and regulations? 
Answer options:18 
 
• Almost always. Bureaucrats almost always act impartially. (1) 
• Often. Bureaucrats often act impartially, and their decision-making is only occasionally influ- 
enced by considerations beyond the laws or regulations relevant to the case. (2) 
• About half the time. Bureaucrats act impartially approximately half of the time. (3) 
• Occasionally. Bureaucrats only occasionally act impartially, and their decision-making is often 
influenced by considerations beyond the laws or regulations relevant to the case. (4) 
• Hardly ever. Bureaucrats hardly ever act impartially. (5) 
• Don’t know. (99) 
 
 
A.2 Part Two 
 
Thank you for completing the first section of the survey. In this second section we would like you to 
answer questions about a series of hypothetical scenarios. 
This section is designed not as a check on your expertise, but to help us to create better country-level 
measures. Your responses are crucial in ensuring high data quality. When answering, please consider 
only information presented in the given scenario. 
Patronage: vignette 1 
Consider this description: 
In country X, a recent representative survey of the public officials working in the central government 
showed that the workforce is highly educated and also balanced in terms of the ethnic composition 
of the country’s population. This achievement is linked to the long-standing policy of merit-based 
recruitment to government that rooted out most blatant forms of nepotism and cronyism. 
Now, consider this question: 
In country X, to what extent are appointments to bureaucratic positions in the central government 
based on individuals’ political and/or personal connections? 
Almost all appointments are based on political and/or personal connections. (5) 
Most of the appointments are based on political and/or personal connections, and only a few of the 
positions are filled meritocratically. (4) 
About half of the appointments are based on political and/or personal connections. (3) 
Only a few of the appointments are based on political and/or personal connections, and most positions 
are filled meritocratically. (2) 
Almost no appointments are based on political and/or personal connections. (1) 
 




Patronage: vignette 2 
Consider this description: 
In country X, applicants for jobs in the central government usually go through several rounds of a 
selection process, through which the most knowledgeable, skilled and experienced candidates are 
identified and eventually hired. However, being a relative of a current government official or receiv- 
ing “a good word” from an influential politician, may sometimes tip the balance in favor of a less 
qualified, but better connected applicant. 
Now, consider this question: 
In country X, to what extent are appointments to bureaucratic positions in the central government 
based on individuals’ political and/or personal connections? 
Almost all appointments are based on political and/or personal connections. (5) 
Most of the appointments are based on political and/or personal connections, and only a few of the 
positions are filled meritocratically. (4) 
About half of the appointments are based on political and/or personal connections. (3) 
Only a few of the appointments are based on political and/or personal connections, and most positions 
are filled meritocratically. (2) 
Almost no appointments are based on political and/or personal connections. (1) 
Patronage: vignette 3 
Consider this description: 
In country X, a central government agency is recruiting a policy expert. The vacancy is advertised 
publicly and the agency receives around 150 applications. The director of the agency receives a  call 
from an influential politician, letting him/her know that the politician’s daughter is amongst the 
applicants. The daughter is subsequently selected for the position, even though she is not, for her 
competence and other merits, among the best applicants. This situation is very typical for the central 
government of country X. 
Now, consider this question: 
In country X, to what extent are appointments to bureaucratic positions in the central government 
based on individuals’ political and/or personal connections? 
Almost all appointments are based on political and/or personal connections. (5) 
Most of the appointments are based on political and/or personal connections, and only a few of the 
positions are filled meritocratically. (4) 
About half of the appointments are based on political and/or personal connections. (3) 
Only a few of the appointments are based on political and/or personal connections, and most positions 
are filled meritocratically. (2) 
Almost no appointments are based on political and/or personal connections. (1) 
 
 
A.3 Part Three 
 
Thank you for completing the second section of the survey. For the third and final section, we would 









Prefer not to say (4) 
Education: What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
 
None (1) 
Primary and/or secondary (2) 
Post-secondary including vocational training (3) 
Bachelor degree or equivalent (4) 
Master degree or equivalent (5) 
PhD (6) 
Age: Which year were you born? 
 
2001 . . . 1929 
Country of birth: In which country were you born? 
 
Afghanistan (4) . . . Zimbabwe (716) 
Country of residence: In which country do you live today? 
 
Afghanistan (4) . . . Zimbabwe (716) 
Current employer: Who is your current employer? 
The current executive (including presidential administration and cabinet) (1) 
A ministry, board or agency within the central government (2) 
A ministry, board or agency within the regional or local government (3) 
A state-owned enterprise (4) 
A public university (5) 
A private university (6) 
A private sector company (7) 
A non-governmental or a non-profit private organization (8) 
Other (9) 
 
Employment duration: For how long have you been working for your current employer? 
 
Less than 2 years (1) 
2 to 4 years (2) 




8 to 10 years (4) 
11 to 13 years (5) 
14 to 16 years (6) 
More than 16 years (7) 
 
Self-assessment: Overall, how would you assess your knowledge about the bureaucratic behavior 
and the bureaucratic structure of the central government in your chosen country? 
 












Table B.1: Countries with less than three experts per country, N = 27 
 
Country N Country N 
Burundi 1 Algeria 2 
Chad 1 Bahrain 2 
Congo 1 Barbados 2 
Cote d’Ivoire 1 Cyprus 2 
Cuba 1 Iran 2 
Djibouti 1 Kuwait 2 
Dominican Republic 1 Mongolia 2 
El Salvador 1 Nicaragua 2 
Laos 1 Senegal 2 
Madagascar 1 South Sudan 2 
Namibia 1 Syria 2 
Niger 1   
Solomon Islands 1   
Somalia 1   
Suriname 1   






Table B.2: Countries with three or more experts, N = 115 
 
Country N Country N Country N 
Afghanistan 6 Ghana 10 North Macedonia 8 
Albania 15 Greece 11 Norway 14 
Angola 4 Guatemala 3 Pakistan 6 
Argentina 10 Guinea 3 Paraguay 5 
Armenia 7 Guyana 3 Peru 11 
Australia 18 Hong Kong 5 Philippines 8 
Austria 5 Hungary 17 Poland 10 
Azerbaijan 5 Iceland 5 Portugal 6 
Bahamas 5 India 16 Romania 15 
Bangladesh 13 Indonesia 16 Russia 15 
Belarus 9 Iraq 5 Rwanda 4 
Belgium 5 Ireland 5 Saudi Arabia 3 
Benin 3 Israel 10 Serbia 5 
Bolivia 4 Italy 12 Singapore 6 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 9 Jamaica 5 Slovakia 6 
Botswana 4 Japan 8 Slovenia 9 
Brazil 10 Jordan 6 South Africa 17 
Bulgaria 8 Kazakhstan 12 Spain 20 
Cambodia 5 Kenya 10 Sri Lanka 3 
Cameroon 5 Korea, South 21 Sudan 4 
Canada 10 Kyrgyzstan 6 Sweden 11 
Chile 8 Latvia 7 Switzerland 5 
China 14 Lebanon 5 Taiwan 12 
Colombia 5 Lesotho 5 Tanzania 6 
Costa Rica 4 Lithuania 8 Thailand 3 
Croatia 8 Malawi 5 Togo 3 
Czech Rep 9 Malaysia 4 Tunisia 4 
Denmark 13 Mali 3 Turkey 18 
Ecuador 3 Malta 8 Uganda 5 
Egypt 3 Mexico 17 Ukraine 5 
Eritrea 3 Moldova 7 UAE 5 
Estonia 9 Montenegro 5 UK 9 
Ethiopia 8 Morocco 3 USA 42 
Fiji 3 Mozambique 3 Uruguay 5 
Finland 6 Nepal 5 Uzbekistan 7 
France 7 Netherlands 13 Venezuela 12 
Georgia 9 New Zealand 13 Vietnam 4 
Germany 19 Nigeria 22 Zambia 9 
    Zimbabwe 5 




C Individual-level determinants of expert assessments 
 
Table C.1: Expert background and their assessments 
 
 
 proff1 proff2 proff3 close1 close2 close3 impar1 impar2 
female 0.17 0.01 -0.14 -0.02 0.03 -0.01 0.17 0.23** 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.11) (0.10) 
birthyear 0.02*** 0.02*** -0.00 0.00* 0.00 -0.00 0.01*** 0.01*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
education -0.10 -0.06 -0.11 0.07 0.11** 0.03 -0.14 0.03 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.12) (0.11) 
work uni -0.25** -0.28** -0.16 -0.02 -0.10** -0.07** -0.23* -0.34*** 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.12) (0.11) 
work duration -0.02 -0.03 -0.09*** -0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.03 -0.04* 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) 
self-assessment -0.03 -0.06 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04** 0.01 -0.06 -0.08** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.05) (0.04) 
Constant -28.59*** -28.08*** 7.59 -6.38* -5.64 1.32 -21.71** -19.50** 
 (8.95) (8.69) (8.86) (3.82) (3.75) (2.46) (9.40) (8.57) 
Observations 674 674 674 674 674 674 674 674 
R-squared 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.07 
Note: All experts who answered parts one and three of the survey are included. OLS estimates 
(unstandardized coefficients), standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. In 
this analysis Proff1 (Patronage), Proff3 (Tenure) and Impart1 (Political Interference) are recorded in 
such a way that higher values stand for less patronage in recruitment, stronger security of tenure and 




Table C.2: Expert background, including country fixed-effect, and their assessments 
 
 
proff1 proff2 proff3 close1 close2 close3 impar1 impar2 
female 0.17* -0.04 -0.19** 0.01 -0.02 -0.03 0.20** 0.28*** 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.10) (0.10) 
birthyear -0.00 0.00 -0.01*** 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
education 0.00 -0.01 -0.04 0.02 0.03 -0.02 -0.03 0.05 
 (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.11) (0.10) 
work uni -0.04 -0.05 0.00 0.04 -0.07 -0.03 0.04 -0.08 
 (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.11) (0.10) 
work duration -0.02 -0.04* -0.06*** -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.04 -0.05** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
self-assessment -0.00 -0.06 -0.01 -0.00 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 -0.07* 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04) 
Constant 8.62 1.34 30.34*** -1.96 0.79 3.22 6.65 5.66 
 (7.91) (8.29) (8.13) (4.31) (3.67) (2.70) (9.11) (8.54) 
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 674 674 674 674 674 674 674 674 
R-squared 0.61 0.55 0.58 0.34 0.50 0.37 0.53 0.51 
Note: All experts who answered parts one and three of the survey are included. OLS estimated 
(unstandardized coefficients), standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. In 
this analysis Proff1 (Patronage), Proff3 (Tenure) and Impart1 (Political Interference) are recorded in 
such a way that higher values stand for less patronage in recruitment, stronger security of tenure and 




D Country-level Estimates 
 
Table D.1: Distribution of IRT-based country-level point estimates by region 
 
 Africa Europe Latin America Asia Total 
Patronage 15 41 10 24 90 
Merit 13 7 13 23 86 
Tenure 15 38 12 25 90 
Political Interference 13 38 11 21 83 
Impartiality 13 41 10 20 84 








Note: The upper panel depicts the spatial distribution of Merit estimates (N = 86) and the lower panel depicts 




































Figure E.1: Association between Merit and individual indicators of Closedness 
 
Note: Values of Merit are on the Y axes of all graphs. Values on the X axis are: Entry at the lowest level/Close1 




Figure E.2: Association between the Merit, Impartiality and ICRG Bureaucratic Quality 
 
Note: Values of ICRG Bureaucratic quality are on the X axes in both graphs. Values of Merit are on the Y axis 
of the left panel (r = .73***, N = 76). Values of Impartiality are on the Y axis of the right panel (r = .8***, N 
= 76 
 









F QoG Expert Surveys 2011, 2015 and 2020: Comparison 
 
Table F.1: Correspondence of questions between QoG Expert Survey 2011, 2015 and 2020 
 
 
Concept 2020 questions 2015 questions 2011 questions 
 
 
Patronage: Political proff1 q2 b q2 b 
Patronage: Social proff1 q2 c — 
Merit proff2 q2 a q2 a 
Tenure proff3 q2 j q2 f 
Impartiality impar2  q7  q4 
Entry at the lowest level only  close1 q2 i  — 
Entry through examination only  close2 q2 d q2 c 
Special laws  close3 q4 f q8 f 
 
Note: q2b: When recruiting public sector employees, the political connections of the applicants de- 
cide who gets the job? q2c: When recruiting public sector employees, the personal connections of the 
applicants (for example kinship or friendship) decide who gets the job? q2a: When recruiting public 
sector employees, the skills and merits of the applicants decide who gets the job? q2j/q2f: Once one 
is recruited as a public sector employee, one remains a public sector employee for the rest of one’s 
career. q7: By a common definition, impartiality implies that when implementing policies, public 
sector employees should not take anything about the citizen/case into consideration that is not stipu- 
lated in the policy. Generally speaking, how often would you say that public sector employees today, 
in your chosen country, act impartially when deciding how to implement a policy in an individual 
case? q2i: Entry to the public sector is open only at the lowest level of the hierarchy. q2d/q2c: Public 
sector employees are hired via a formal examination system. q4f/q8f: The terms of employment for 
public sector employees are regulated by special laws that do not apply to private sector employees. 








 Patronage Merit Tenure Impartiality 





















N 91 91 90 90 





















N 82 79 77 76 
















N 80 77 81 76 
 
Note: The 2015 QoG Expert Survey contained two separate Patronage questions: one relating to political 
patronage and another relating to personal connections. The question on patronage in the 2011 and 2020 




Table F.3: QoG Expert Surveys 2011, 2015 and 2020: Correlational analysis of the Closedness traits 
 
 
 Entry level Examination Special laws 











N  90 90 











N 98 99 99 











N  93 96 
 











Note: Rank order values from 2020 are on the X axis. Values from 2015 are on the Y axis. Higher values 
(lower rank) stand for more patrimonial entry to public bureaucracy. Poland became more patrimonial in 2020, 
while Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Tanzania and Uganda became less patrimonial. 
 
 
Table F.4: Bureaucratic Structure and Bureaucratic Behavior: country-level estimates from the Quality of Government Expert Survey 2020. 
 












1 Afghanistan 0,377 -0,158 -0,823 0,450 -0,785 0,5 0,67 1 0,562 -1,552 
2 Albania 0,933 -0,432 -0,223 0,813 -0,185 0,57 0,87 0,93 0,855 -1,809 
3 Angola 1,360   0,574 -0,114 0,5 0,5 0,5 -1,362  
4 Argentina 0,216 -0,448 0,498 0,066 -0,048 0,38 0,22 1 -0,502 -0,725 
5 Armenia 0,191 -0,113 0,518 0,330 -0,437 0,17 1 1 0,529 -0,431 
6 Australia -0,722 1,179 1,343 -0,822 1,110 0,28 0,22 0,82 -1,262 1,899 
7 Austria 0,277   0,097 0,7 0,6 0,75 0,8 0,264  
8 Azerbaijan 0,828     0,75 1 0,33 -0,491  
9 Bahamas   0,582   0,67 0 1 -0,344  
10 Bahrain           
11 Bangladesh -0,035 0,286 0,753 0,346 -0,694 1 1 1 2,152 0,229 
12 Belarus 0,462 -0,286 -0,171 0,793 -0,349 0,78 0,67 0,67 0,026 -1,268 
13 Belgium -0,023 0,262 1,292 -0,778 0,803 0,6 1 1 1,373 0,573 
14 Benin       0 1   
15 Bolivia      1 0 0,67 -0,773  
16 Bosnia & Herzegovina 1,008 -0,468 0,385 0,640 0,290 0,44 1 0,89 0,711 -1,477 
17 Botswana -0,236 0,259 0,343 0,176 0,353 0 0,5 1 -0,719 0,089 
18 Brazil -0,010 0,510 0,977 -0,221 0,076 0,63 0,9 1 1,237 0,536 
19 Bulgaria 0,032 -0,510 0,448 0,661 -0,411 0,71 0,88 1 1,365 -0,654 
20 Cambodia   1,078   1 0,6 0,75 0,605  
21 Cameroon 0,882 -0,587 -0,167  -0,523 0,5 0,8 1 0,809 -1,847 
22 Canada -1,271 1,379 1,603 -0,567 1,370 0,5 0,5 1 0,255 2,690 
23 Chile 0,078 0,822 0,676 -0,714 0,509 0,13 0,33 1 -0,784 0,495 
24 China -0,070 0,283 0,169 0,880 -0,583 0,77 0,86 1 1,439 -0,150 
25 Colombia 0,091 -0,318 0,601 0,574 -0,109 0,25 0,6 1 -0,048 -0,449 
26 Costa Rica 0,037 0,114 0,849 0,052 0,099 0,33 0,75 1 0,392 0,101 
27 Croatia 0,234 -0,125 1,053 0,345 -0,154 0,86 1 1 1,874 -0,105 
28 Cyprus           
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29 Czech Rep -0,498 0,969 0,589 -0,503 0,176 0,14 0,67 0,86 -0,595 1,027 
30 Denmark -1,049 1,188 0,574 -0,937 1,026 0,15 0,15 0,7 -2,029 1,644 
31 Ecuador  -1,001  0,803   0,33 1   
32 Egypt        1   
33 Eritrea 0,951 -0,953 -1,232 1,152  0,67 0 0,67 -1,422 -2,926 
34 Estonia -0,536 0,953 0,341 -0,842 1,428 0,13 0 1 -1,399 0,874 
35 Ethiopia 0,430 -0,401 -0,871 0,449 -0,674 0,75 0,14 0,75 -0,726 -1,816 
36 Fiji   0,435   0 0,33 0,67 -2,105  
37 Finland -0,924 1,076  -0,658 1,628 0,17 0,5 1 -0,395  
38 France -0,633 1,006 1,991 -0,749 1,085 0,5 1 1 1,178 2,140 
39 Georgia   -0,878   0,63 0,67 0,89 0,447  
40 Germany -0,445 0,701 1,760 -1,386 1,370 0,59 0,71 1 0,807 1,588 
41 Ghana 0,547 -0,322 0,346 0,417 -0,423 0,67 0,44 0,8 -0,170 -1,008 
42 Greece 0,428 -0,041 1,015 0,290 0,297 0,5 0,6 1 0,439 -0,228 
43 Guatemala      0,33  0,67   
44 Guinea      0,67 0,33    
45 Guyana  -0,037 0,515 0,263 0,158 0,33 0 0,67 -2,071  
46 Hong Kong -1,024 1,850 1,779 -1,925 0,956 0,5 1 1 1,178 2,971 
47 Hungary 0,773 -0,435 -0,843 0,229 -0,082 0,38 0,38 1 -0,220 -2,108 
48 Iceland -0,781 0,986 1,130 -0,680 1,442 0,2 0 1 -1,253 1,651 
49 India -0,605 0,535 1,069 0,420 -0,364 0,94 0,94 1 1,915 1,114 
50 Indonesia -0,432 0,633 0,636 -0,499 0,162 0,56 1 1 1,300 0,746 
51 Iraq 0,747 -1,298 0,184 1,099 -0,820 1 0 1 0,305 -2,041 
52 Ireland -1,082 0,680 1,730 -0,418 0,716 0,2 1 0,75 -0,215 2,081 
53 Israel -0,297 0,347 0,785 -0,227  0,63 0,67 0,89 0,447 0,515 
54 Italy 0,270 0,379 1,681 0,266 0,222 1 1 0,82 1,564 0,690 
55 Jamaica 0,283 0,154 0,328   0,4 0 0,6 -2,157 -0,433 
56 Japan -0,666 1,459 0,976 -1,056 1,070 1 1 1 2,152 1,814 
57 Jordan 0,268 -0,384  0,307 -0,304 0,8 0,75 1 1,301  
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58 Kazakhstan 0,103 0,136 0,301 0,078 -0,139 0,45 1 0,6 -0,204 -0,316 
59 Kenya 0,917 0,380 1,258 0,619 -0,379 0,4 0,5 1 0,060 -0,140 
60 Korea, South -0,702 1,423 1,815 -0,722 0,745 0,71 1 1 1,596 2,399 
61 Kyrgyzstan 0,508 -0,518 -0,600 0,234 -0,876 0,5 0,5 1 0,255 -1,783 
62 Latvia -0,486  0,507 -0,392 0,416 0,29 0,43 1 -0,295  
63 Lebanon 0,892 -0,648 0,854  -0,546 0,75 1 1 1,665 -1,195 
64 Lesotho 0,250 -0,056 0,894 0,102 -0,357 0,6 0 1 -0,474 -0,174 
65 Lithuania -0,364    0,862 0,25 1 0,88 0,287  
66 Malawi      0,8 0,6 0,8 0,377  
67 Malaysia      0,25 0,75 1 0,229  
68 Mali      1 0,67    
69 Malta 0,090  1,477  -0,232 0,5 0,75 1 0,716  
70 Mexico 1,279 -0,302 -0,298 0,549 -0,234 0,29 0,13 1 -0,839 -2,047 
71 Moldova      0,71 0,86 0,86 0,870  
72 Montenegro 0,492 0,100 0,596 -0,177 -0,171 0,4 0,8 1 0,614 -0,462 
73 Morocco      0,33 0,67 1 0,238  
74 Mozambique        1   
75 Nepal 0,233     1 1 1 2,152  
76 Netherlands -0,834 1,806 1,191 -1,328 1,216 0,33 0,15 0,54 -2,202 2,371 
77 New Zealand -1,257 1,214 1,959 -1,464 1,278 0,08 0,17 0,27 -3,537 2,798 
78 Nigeria 0,345 -0,322 0,457 0,054 -0,022 0,79 0,74 0,81 0,640 -0,763 
79 North Macedonia 0,450 -0,565 -0,199  -0,401 0,5 0,63 0,86 0,024 -1,493 
80 Norway -2,422 1,899 2,145 -1,749 0,784 0,23 0,31 0,77 -1,371 4,424 
81 Pakistan  -0,055 0,843 1,039 -0,458 0,67 1 1 1,503  
82 Paraguay 0,269 -0,474 0,518 0,018  0,4 0,2 1 -0,494 -0,775 
83 Peru 0,253 -0,065 -0,339 0,075 -0,076 0,09 0,3 0,82 -1,500 -1,041 
84 Philippines -0,157 0,105 0,244 -0,238 0,281 0,25 0,86 1 0,427 -0,164 
85 Poland 1,340 -0,567 -0,387 0,316 0,413 0,63 0,67 0,63 -0,407 -2,364 
86 Portugal 0,154 -0,342 1,536 0,248 0,769 0,67 0,5 1 0,579 0,129 
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87 Romania 0,151 -0,142 0,513 0,573 -0,360 0,6 1 0,93 1,142 -0,425 
88 Russia 0,579 -0,436 0,217 0,171 -0,258 0,5 0,18 0,83 -0,872 -1,212 
89 Rwanda 0,178 0,493 -0,194 -0,169  0,5 0,5 1 0,255 -0,446 
90 Saudi Arabia 0,424 -0,016 0,644  -0,029 1 0 1 0,305 -0,463 
91 Serbia 0,505 -0,273 0,144 0,439 -0,461 0,6 0,6 1 0,634 -1,075 
92 Singapore -1,434 1,695 1,492 -1,233 0,921 0,5 0,17 0,67 -1,439 2,993 
93 Slovakia 0,157 -0,422 -0,028 0,055 -0,068 0,4 0,8 0,83 0,075 -1,020 
94 Slovenia -0,285 0,715 1,282 -0,391 1,088 0,33 0,67 0,75 -0,571 1,135 
95 South Africa 0,149 -0,334 0,035 0,365 -0,369 0,13 0,25 0,82 -1,492 -0,902 
96 Spain -0,325 -0,152 1,389 -0,092 0,315 0,6 0,9 1 1,188 0,572 
97 Sri Lanka      0,67 1 1 1,503  
98 Sudan       0,33 0,75   
99 Sweden -0,480 1,543 1,602 -1,411 1,276 0,09 0,18 0,73 -2,012 2,159 
100 Switzerland -0,667 1,046 1,572 -1,179 1,252 0 0,2 0,4 -3,214 1,909 
101 Syria           
102 Taiwan -0,803 1,142 1,067 -0,635 0,447 0,55 1 1 1,267 1,746 
103 Tanzania 0,018 0,229 -0,245 0,869 -0,156 0,75 0,2 0,75 -0,621 -0,553 
104 Thailand      0,33 1 1 0,853  
105 Togo      0,67 0,67    
106 Tunisia -0,338  1,375   0,75 0,33 1 0,434  
107 Turkey 0,499 -0,448 -0,693 0,671 -1,097 0,69 0,89 0,94 1,136 -1,786 
108 Uganda -0,136 0,165 0,697 -0,541 -0,490 0 0,6 1 1,004 0,180 
109 Ukraine 0,515 -0,695 -0,467 0,547 -0,601 0,6 0,8 1 -0,933 -1,834 
110 UAE      0,4 0,4 0,75 -0,535  
111 UK -0,832 1,329 1,437 -0,643 1,361 0,22 0,75 0,43 -1,673 2,171 
112 USA -0,353 0,564 0,799 -0,505 0,619 0,24 0,49 1 -0,286 0,739 
113 Uruguay  0,427   0,561 0,4 0,8 0,75 -0,195  
114 Uzbekistan 0,801 -0,590 -0,494 1,469 -0,831 0,57 0,17 0,43 -2,070 -2,009 
115 Venezuela 1,968 -1,706 -1,153 1,621 -1,327 0,58 0 0,92 -0,776 -4,299 
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116 Vietnam 0,333 -0,276 0,996 0,000  1 0,75 1 1,691 -0,344 
117 Zambia 0,498 -0,241 0,098 0,801 0,102 0,44 0 0,38 -2,798 -1,076 
118 Zimbabwe   0,120   0,8 0,4 1 0,654  
 
56 
